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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A STUDY ON GAZPROM GROWTH STRATEGY 
IN NORTH EAST ASIAN REGION 
 
By 
 
ANDROPOVA Tatiana 
 
The work outlines current state of Joint-Stock Company «Gazprom», Russia's and world's 
biggest natural gas producer and exporter. The natural gas market is still developing, and it is 
highly profitable for Gazprom to fix its presence not only in the traditionally gas-dependent 
Europe, but also in the rapidly growing Asian market as well. To succeed in this goal, 
Gazprom has already made a number of acquisitions and started several projects aimed at the 
North East Asian consumers.  
The market of North East Asia is highly dependent on the gas supply from the middle East, 
and the readiness to switch to a neighboring gas producer therefore eliminating unnecessary 
risks, enabling flexible contracting and improving the energy security in the region. 
The analysis shows that the potential of Eastern Siberia and Russian Far East natural gas 
exports is more than enough to feed the needs of the key three importers of the North East 
Asia – China, South Korea and Japan. Each of three has its own preferences and requirements 
for the supplies, and therefore Gazprom needs a diversified infrastructure in order to gain and 
maintain the leading position in the regional gas market. Hence, the strategic development of 
Gazprom should include the upgrade of the infrastructure and massive investments, including 
expanding the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) division to meet high demand for it.  
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1. Introduction 
 
(a) Background 
For the long years the natural gas was considered a useless (if not dangerous) 
companion of the oil extraction process, until the techniques for the gas collection, 
transportation and utilization were introduced. The “blue fuel” has no smell or color but has 
a huge value and prospects, and those states possessing vast reserves of the gas are deemed 
to be in a superior position to the others bonded to import the fuel. There are certain 
advantages in natural gas exporting but some major catches as well: the higher the export is 
the deeper the economy dependence goes, which, in terms of world economy instability, 
means very fragile income. Instead of the simple strategy “to sell as much as can be bought” 
leading to oversaturation of a given market, the natural gas exporters need to diversify the 
strategy regionally. 
 
b) Object of the Study 
It's been proved by the recent two or three decades that there is nothing as vital for 
the world’s economy as the continuous and sufficient supply of the energy. The rapid 
development of the petrochemical industry, highest ever (and still increasing) demand for the 
new materials and composites, growth of the automotive market and expanding consumption 
of electric energy, everything roots from the natural energy resources, oil, coal and gas.  
Russia is now often referred to as the “oil-n-gas economy”, which economically 
means that a huge percent of GDP and state revenues comes from the export of fossil fuels 
crude oil and natural gas. Hence, the Russian Federation greatly depends on the market 
prices of oil and gas and the Russian budget is extremely fragile due to unexpected 
fluctuations of the trade prices; but at the same time the volume of exported oil and gas also 
puts the importers into a tricky dependence on the Russian fuels and threats sole countries’ 
and regions’ energy security. 
This study aims at revealing possible future of the North-East Asian natural gas 
market for Gazprom company, Russia’s and world top gas exporter. 
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The world natural gas market is highly regionalized and each area has its own 
specifics shaped by the resource base, transportation options and overall development level. 
In case of the relatively young North-East Asian gas market, three developed states of the 
region – continental China, South Korea and Japan – are importing gas, but the volume and 
means are different for each. China is trying to avoid rising the NG consumption level by 
promoting its own coal and gas supplies, but its growing economy demands more fuel; Japan 
still imports mostly oil, but is likely to shift to gas consumption in case stable pipeline 
supply provided; South Korea is worlds biggest liquefied gas importer but is ready to give up 
sea-freight imports in favor of landline supplies. All of the mentioned three are perfect 
buyers for the gas originating from the neighboring Russia, and such volumes can only be 
handled by Gazprom, Russian near-to-monopoly natural gas company. With its world’s 
biggest deposits of NG multiplied by experience and huge infrastructure, Gazprom is likely 
to become the regionally dominative supplier of natural gas both via continental pipelines 
and LNG carriers. In order to reach this goal, continuous development and upgrade of the 
infrastructure (both new and existing) in required, which in turn means re-balancing the 
investment scheme in the region. At this point the strategy of Gazprom involves major shift 
to LNG production to feed the needs of Japan and Korea in the initial stage and gradual 
expanding of the pipeline network to China, South Korea and Japan in the long-term 
perspective. The measures taken to extend the Russian gas export agreement framework will 
not only benefit the importing states’ energy security but also contribute to the regional 
peace and security. Thus this study’s object is Gazprom’s ability to perform such rebuilding 
and initiate sufficient investment for the purpose of gaining the dominant market share in the 
North East Asia. 
 
(с) Research Methodology and Organization of the Thesis 
 
In this study basically was used method in-depth analysis by exploring different 
scientific research papers, materials from international energy conferences and academic 
books. Considerable contribution in gathering latest information was made by help of 
specialists analytics from company Gazprom. Internet resources were used for getting last 
statistic data for financial performance outlook.   
At the beginning, the overall energy industry situation was revised, making an 
emphasis on the Russian position in the global arena by examination of international articles, 
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academic papers, and analyzing different visions on natural gas perspectives from worldwide 
analytics. The author also examined open Internet resources in order to obtain the latest 
statistic data available. 
In the Chapter III, the case study of Gazprom’s history and growth strategy was 
examined, basing on the company vision and perspectives of development in the future. In 
this chapter the scientific papers were also used, but the author found extremely discrepant 
position and vision on Gazprom performance in most sources. There is a number of 
contradictions among academics from different countries. Therefore, it was challenging to 
compose independent point of view on current situation. 
Returning to case study, in Chapter IV the author considered problems in Gazprom 
performance by means of SWOT analysis. Finding gaps in the marketing strategy, the value 
chain and the company development strategy, it helped to give recommendations in Chapter 
V and sketch out concrete measures in achievement of the future perspectives. 
 
(d) Literature review 
 
Since the energy exports are the most profitable field of the Russian economy, it is 
understandable (although still strange) that the leaders of the state, the President and the 
Chairman of the Government, are usually involved in the procedures of signing the contracts 
that seem to be purely commercial.  
The whole industry is ought to change it’s face, and probably it will differ form the 
predicted one. It is almost a common vision that Gazprom will sooner or later combine all 
energy sources and possibly the electricity production in a globalized conglomerate that 
would follow not only the market trends but the government guidelines as well. In Russia, the 
very name of “Gazprom” has turned into a symbol of a successful, rich and powerful 
company, extremely close to the political elite. 
The literature of the subject is far from being numerous and tends to include various 
political connotations related to former President, current Prime Minister V.Putin’s activities. 
Aside of that, most of the dedicated researches are somewhat outdated as the gas market has 
been actively developing in the recent years and project deemed ‘eternal’ (for their delayed 
planning and overwaited implementation) have been finally completed.  
I would like to emphasize several opinions expressed by the following authors. 
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“The future of Russian Gas and Gazprom”  
By J. Stern, Oxford Institute for energy studies, 2005 
The Author analyses the main concerns of the Russian Natural Gas Industry – its 
position in the market, the possibilities and challenges, the necessity of the industry reform 
and facilities renewal, as well as some political aspects of the gas trade. Another strong 
concern is the possible domestic profitability of the further gas fields development as the 
local gas prices are far from being sufficient source of capital and most of the cash comes 
from abroad. Thus the local producers, non-capable of exporting their gas outside of Russia, 
will form the new domestic market, less dominated by Gazprom. The economical instability 
of the early post-Soviet years has brought to life numerous ‘intermediaries’ which helped to 
protect the gas trade from the possible damage from the rapidly-growing debts and non-
payment. Some of the former intermediaries have turned into top independent producers, 
others have disappeared from the gas stage. The current policy of Gazprom implies the direct 
inter-state long-term contracting, omitting the third parties from the business chain.  
But one should keep in mind that the work originates from the period when Russia 
started gaining huge revenues of natural resources’ exports and therefore was blamed for 
using its supplies as a political tool.  
Three Asian countries that are the main driving forces of the NEA gas market 
development still are the most favorable partners for the future exports via traditional pipeline. 
China is still somewhat unpredictable, but still it is bonded by numerous agreements to the 
Gazprom’s future strategy. Besides the internal concerns of each mentioned county there are 
several political concerns require joint actions several of the regional players.  Another 
potential market for the Russian gas, Korea, needs to solve its internal problems and reform 
the gas importation system. The Japanese demand for gas contradicts the political antipathy 
to Russia itself, and these uncertainties make the prospects of the Russian natural gas in Asia 
far less optimistic. Intention to diversify Russian gas exports to Asia may not be to the 
advantage of S. Korea – given the likelihood that any pipeline gas would need to pass 
through China (unless it was to transit North Korea) – but the continuing uncertainties that 
surround privatization of KOGAS and the liberalization and restructuring of the gas industry 
may also suggest a longer time frame. When this is considered in the context of Japanese 
reluctance – for reasons relating both to demand uncertainties and political antipathy to 
Russian gas – to import Sakhalin LNG in large quantities let alone even more substantial 
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volumes of pipeline gas the prospects for significant Russian gas exports to Asia appears to 
be somewhat further distant than is often believed.  
The future of Gazprom is clear, although not definitely bright. The once-awaited 
merger with Rosneft is unlikely to happen in any near future, but the two companies are 
acting with full support of the Government and are likely to continue their aggressive policy 
both domestically and abroad. 
Gazprom still has numerous issues to face, and author outlines it as below: 
 
1. Corporatization and legal unbundling  
2. Maintaining the reliability of pipeline network  
3. Replacing gas production from declining fields  
4. Developing and maintaining reliable large-scale import relationships with Central Asian 
states  
5. Maintaining stable sale and transit relationships with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova  
6. Managing a very large European export portfolio in regards to liberalization and 
competition1. 
The outline gives a straight direction for Gazprom’s future strategy development – 
in order to maintain a stable and, more important, profitable business, Gazprom will have to 
re-balance its price and volume policies, fixing its outdated approach to the three main 
markets – the local, CIS, and EU. Allocating the priorities will largely depend not only on the 
global pricing and demand trends, but also on the political guidelines of the Russian 
government.  
 
“Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy” By Energy Forum Baker Institute for 
Public Policy, Rice University, 2004 
Oil and gas exports are still the main momentum providers to the Russia’s economy 
development, and it is clear that Russia is capable of further extension of the raw fuel 
production. In case of the natural gas exports it is clear that the competition is near to zero, 
thus Gazprom does not have to struggle to maintain its market position. Gazprom’s ambitions 
are realistic, i.e. in the situation of near-monopolistic exports the company only has to worry 
about the technical capabilities of the infrastructure leaving aside the possible threats.  
                                                        
1 «Russian Oil and Gas Industry: Energy dimensions in Russian Economic and Foreign Policy”, Kong Chyong Chi,  
http://www.futureofenergy.org.uk/uploads/ 
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Exportation of the Russian fossil fuels follows the traditional routes. The pipelines 
that have been used for decades to deliver Russian gas to Europe are facing numerous 
challenges of both technical and political nature. New pipelines, and what’s more important, 
new delivery options like LNG or CNG are critical for maintaining the sustainable growth of 
Gazprom and retaining its leading positions in the regions of Russian gas export interests. Oil 
and gas pipelines’ management as an influential mean for controlling independent producers. 
As it was re-confirmed by the President of Russia in 2004, the pipelines will remain a state-
manipulated tool to control the gas flow (and cash flow) and maintain government influence 
in the fuel exports. But it is clear that such policy will also minimize the trust potential of the 
gas importers and is likely to undermine Gazprom’s development strategy (especially in the 
business-independence concerned European market). EU-Russia energy chain and the US gas 
market policy.   The Strategic Energy Partnership signed between the Russian Federation and 
the European Union in 2000 marks the new stage of Russia-EU energy cooperation. The 
agreement turned out to be of a great value for both parties, making the supply of the natural 
gas to Europe a highly profitable project for Russia and secure power source for Europe. The 
annual gas supply is to reach 187 bcm by 2010 and is most likely to increase in the future. 
Russia’s dominating position in the world natural gas production originates from its 
location and resources, but the market domination is far less determined since competitors, 
even distant ones, are reaching every available importer with LNG offers. The pipeline 
supplies are far more cost-effective and secure, but sticking to the pipes means limiting the 
possibilities with the geographic neighbors. In this view, the only logical solution is to 
diversify the supply means and enter the new markets unavailable to the pipeline delivery. 
The current strategy of Gazprom on the most perspective U.S. and North East Asia markets 
will contribute to the price-generation of the latter and will have an extended outcome in the 
coming years throughout the industry.  
The above can be summarized as an extensive, comprehensive but outdated analysis. 
The current situation urges the whole system of the Russian gas industry to be reviewed. So 
far the prospects of the Russian gas in the Asian market have not been the subject of a 
thorough academic study, but, assuming the world economy crisis will be managed 
successfully, the region will be in need for the cheap and effective energy supply, and 
Gazprom cannot lose this opportunity to gain the leading positions in the North East Asia.  
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2. Global gas industry overview 
 
(a) Role of natural gas in the energy balance 
Amid growing demand for the energy, the new sources of cheap energy are welcome 
in any sphere, from house heating to the car engines. It was not long ago that the natural gas 
emerged as a convenient energy source: but in today’s world it became an important supply 
for diversified spheres – it still burns at most kitchens but it can also be bought in a liquefied 
form at the gas stations around the globe for use in the modern vehicles.  
In the past years the global consumption of the NG has continuously increased, 
pushing exporters to produce more NG and importers to look for better deals and lower 
prices. (Table 1.) 
Table 1. Natural Gas Consumption by Country, 2009 
Rank Country Natural Gas consumption (cu m) 
1 United States 640,900,000,000 
2 Russia 405,800,000,000 
3 Germany 99,550,000,000 
4 United Kingdom 92,850,000,000 
5 Japan 80,420,000,000 
6 Ukraine 79,860,000,000 
7 Iran 72,400,000,000 
8 Italy 71,180,000,000 
9 Saudi Arabia 56,400,000,000 
10 Canada 55,800,000,000 
11 Indonesia 55,300,000,000 
12 Mixico 55,100,000,000 
13 Netherlands 49,720,000,000 
14 Uzbekistan 45,200,000,000 
15 France 42,010,000,000 
16 United Arab Emirates 33,700,000,000 
17 Malaysia 31,250,000,000 
18 Argentina 31,100,000,000 
19 Venezuela 29,400,000,000 
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20 China 29,180,000,000 
21 Thailand 23,930,000,000 
22 Pakistan 23,400,000,000 
23 Australia 23,330,000,000 
24 India 22,750,000,000 
25 Algeria 22,320,000,000 
26 Egypt 21,200,000,000 
27 Korea. South 20,920,000,000 
Source: IEA 
In Asia only few countries have significant deposits of the natural gas on their own 
territory, and the gas supplement is often vital for the countries that are lacking their own 
energy supplement. Since Natural Gas (NG) (and Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) as the way of 
transporting it) is convenient to transport, store and use, the demand is continuously rising. 
The Asia-Pacific region, far from being rich with oil or gas (comparing with Russia 
or OPEC) is one of the most important markets for the gas exporters. NEA countries, led by 
China, are importing up to 75% of their annual gas needs.2The ongoing growth is explained 
by the technology development and energy consumption rise in the region: China, South 
Korea and Japan belong to the world top economies, and require great deal of oil, gas as well 
as raw material for their substantial development.  
 
(b) Natural Gas production and consumption 
Russia is topping the list of the countries with biggest confirmed reserves of the gas, 
its continental part and sea shelf contain roughly 34% of the world’s deposits; Iran is 
following with almost two times less reserves, and if the above two added to Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia it will total over 60 percent of the world’s reserves. In other words, only about 10 to 
15 countries can afford exporting the natural gas aside from feeding their own needs, which 
actually creates the complicated market of the Blue Fuel.  
Russia is the world's largest holder, producer and exporter of natural gas, with huge 
amount of the world’s overall explored reserves has an ambitious goal to become an “energy 
superpower,” since its pure geographic location ensures its dominance in Asian market in the 
future. (Table 2.) 
                                                        
2 Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Outlook, 2009 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/nat_gas.html 
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Table 2.World Natural Gas Reserves By Country as of January 1, 2009 
Country Reserves  
(Trillion Cubic feet) 
Percent of World  
Total 
World 6,254 100.0 
Top 20 Countries 5,674 90.7 
Russia  1,680 26.9 
Uran 992 15.9 
Qatar 892 14.3 
Saudi Arabia 258 4.1 
United States 238 3.8 
United Arab Emirates 214 3.4 
Nigeria 184 2.9 
Venezuela 171 2.7 
Algeria 159 2.5 
Iraq 112 1.8 
Indonesia 106 1.7 
Turkmenistan 94 1.5 
Kazakhstan 85 1.4 
Malaysia 83 1.3 
Norway 82 1.3 
China 80 1.3 
Uzbekistan 65 1.0 
Kuwait 63 1.0 
Egypt 59 0.9 
Canada 58 0.9 
Rest of World 581 9.3 
Source: “Worldwide Look At Reserves and Production”, Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 106, No.48 (December 22, 
2008) pp. 22-23 
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The versatility of the natural gas makes it a useful commodity in various fields: it is 
clean, cheap and efficient thus the natural gas is an essential supply for most of the 
environment-friendly industries and technologically advanced spheres. The advantages of the 
natural gas allowed it to gain strong position in the energy production, and at present roughly 
40 percent of the gas consumed in the industry sphere. Its affordable price makes a serious 
challenge to the traditional oil and coal in the modern economy crisis. The industry forms he 
most important consuming sector for the natural gas with 44 percent of world consumption in 
2007 estimated to grow to 47 percent in 2030, possibly replacing liquid fossil fuel in some 
applications. (Graph 1.) 
Graph 1. World Natural Gas consumption by sector, 1990‐2030 (trillion cubic feet) 
 
Source: IEA 
 
Industrial  use  of  natural  gas  will  probably  reach  an  average  annual 
consumption  increase  rate  of  1.9  percent  from  2007  to  2030,  as  compared  with  an 
average increase of 1.1 percent per year for liquids consumption.3 
Many countries are now using gas to generate power for local consumption, reserving 
their oil for export. Companies are pursuing both LNG and regional pipeline-network options. 
The core technologies of LNG, liquefaction and regasification, are steadily advancing 
towards the minimizations of costs and time. To this extend LNG is the best alternative for 
those countries bound to import gas from far abroad and also allows the producers to reach 
stranded deposits without heavy investments to the pipeline building. The scale of usage of 
LNG as the vehicle fuel has grown from his growth initiated the new parts of industry – both 
                                                        
3 Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Outlook, 2009 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/nat_gas.html 
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car conversion and widespread LNG/CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) gas station networks, 
which in turn attracts more consumers to the idea of using cheap LNG as the fuel for their car. 
The Liquefied Natural Gas export has shown its profitability for those countries, 
which, like Republic of Peru, Republic of Venezuela, Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of 
Iraq, State of Kuwait, State of Qatar, United Arab Emirates etc. have proven reserves that 
allow to maintain high reserves‐to‐production ratio. The above is true for all states that 
have  an  appropriate  technological  and  infrastructure  basis,  but  some  of  the  gas‐rich 
countries prefer to use the relatively cheap gas for the domestic needs and export it via 
old‐style pipeline networks rather than invest in LNG facilities.  
In case of other new players on the market, like China or India, the willingness 
to enter the LNG trade urges the massive capital and technology investments along with 
extended research works that are necessary to overcome the infrastructure, geopolitics 
and accessibility issues. 
The vast deposits of gas in the Russian Far East may form the major supply base 
for  the Asian market. The  reserves  can be  subdivided  into  four geographical  clusters: 
Chukotskiy  Autonomous  Region,  Kamchatskaya  Oblast,  Sakhalinskaya  Oblast  and  the 
Republic of Sakha. (Table 3.) 
 
Table 3. Natural Gas Reserves of the RFE (billion cub.m.) 
 Explored Deposits Overall Reserves Prospective 
Resources 
Sakha Republic 
(Yakutia) 
26 2,200.0 123.3 
Kamchatskaya Oblast 4 22.6 11.5 
Sakhalinskaya Oblast 50 946.6 2000.2 
Chukotskiy 
Autonomous Region 
2 14.7 11.4 
Total 82 3,183.9 2,146.2 
Source: Andrey Vasenev, “Gasification Projects in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia”, 
May 2006 
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(c) World Gas Markets 
The geographical differentiation of natural gas markets is based on the location of the 
main gas consuming highly developed countries – European market, North East Asia market, 
American market, etc. Today, Europe is clearly the oldest and most institutionalized market, 
American and NEA gas markets are still building itself up – the most general agreements for 
long-term large-scale supplies were signed in the past 10-12 years, setting up the grounds for 
major shift towards gas promotion and consumption.  
The European imported gas dependence has played a meantrick with Europeans 
earlier in 2009, showing that sometimes gas supply can be turned into a political weapon not 
even by the exporting country but by the transiting state. But the situation clearly showed the 
importance of the natural gas supply to the European consumers, primarily for the electricity- 
and heat-producing enterprises. Russian gas accounts for more than 44 % of annual NG 
consumption in Europe, and wise versa the revenues from the gas exports form roughly 25 % 
of the Russian budget. Europe has no replacement for the gas imported from Russia, and the 
dependence on Russian import creates huge security concerns within the EU states, but no 
sufficient substitute was ever suggested.  
 Demand for gas in Asia will rise by an average 3.6 percent a year through 2030 as 
economic growth boosts the use of fuels, according to the International Energy Agency. 
While consumption has been eroded this year by the global recession, the region’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) is set to expand by an average 4 percent annually over the next 20 
years, ExxonMobil Corp. data shows. Demand in Europe will advance at an average annual 
rate of 1 percent through 2030, which advises 28 industrialized countries on energy policy. 
Thus the main players for any given gas market are clear: a group of states with high 
demand for natural fuel and deficit of domestic production represents the Buyers and a group 
of (or single) gas-rich neighboring state forms the Seller. The nature of the natural gas 
transportation presumes that the markets tend to be regionally oriented, and only large 
exporters are capable of delivering their production far outside the ‘domestic region’. 
Current direction of the gas industry development includes creation of the wide and 
sophisticated pipeline network along with LNG (Liquid Natural Gas) and CNG(Compressed 
Natural Gas) transportation routes and means. Further extension of these will eventually 
bring up new buyers presently located aside from the main pipelines or lacking the access to 
the gas transportation routes (e.g. away from seashore). 
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The global consumption of the natural gas has reached 3 trillion cubic meters of gas, 
with 2 trillion consumed by North America, Europe and Eurasia, while the rest was exported. 
The global consumption is likely to exceed 5 trillion cbm in 2008, with most of additional 
volume attributing to the LNG exports. 
In comparison to the oil market, gas exporters are not dominated by the states with 
the largest reserves, some of which are even out of the top-10 providers. Over 50 percent of 
the world exports are provided by Russia, U.S. and Canada. The pipelines are still the most 
cost-effective way to deliver gas to the end-users, although the construction costs are high, 
the technology allows continuous massive transportation of gas. The pipelines are limited by 
the physical and geographical factors and are getting more expensive to build, and island-
states are literally excluded from the potential pipeline importers.  
Another complication of the pipeline trade is the political situation – the pipe might 
get used in the political games not only by the suppliers themselves but by the transiting 
countries as well, which puts the recipients in a fragile position of double dependence as it 
happened with Ukrainian transit in 2008 and Turkmenistan transit in 2007. 
The supplies by means of LNG may become the other option for the importers, but 
the technology has its own flaws as well – the LNG availability is subject to the port 
infrastructure and certain climatic options. For the providers the technology also poses 
numerous requirements, and all these points combined sometimes prevent the natural gas 
exporters states from entering the LNG market.  
 According to the EIA, global trade of LNG amounted to about 200 billion cbmin 
2008, which is less than 15 percent of the global natural gas trade. By 2008, 17 states entered 
the LNG export business, and the same number of importers was noted.. (Table 4.) 
  18
Table 4. Countries that import and export LNG 
 
Countries that Export LNG Countries that Import LNG 
Algeria (1971)  
Australia (1989)  
Brunei (1972)  
Equatorial Guinea (2007)  
Egypt (2004)  
Indonesia (1977)  
Libya (1970)  
Malaysia (1983)  
Nigeria (1999)  
Norway (2007) 
Oman (2000)  
Qatar (1997)  
Trinidad and Tobago, Republic of (1999)  
United Arab Emirates (1977)  
United States of America (1969)  
Belgium, Kingdom of (1987)  
China (2006)  
Dominican Republic (2003)  
French Republic) (1972)  
Greece (2000)  
India (2004)  
Italy (1971)  
Japan (1969)  
Mexico (2006)  
Portugal (2003)  
Puerto Rico (2000)  
South Korea, Republic of (1986)  
Spain, Kingdom of (1969)  
Taiwan (Republic of China) (1990)  
Turkey, Republic of (1992)  
United Kingdom (2005)  
United States of America (1971) 
Source: http://www.energy.ca.gov/lng/worldwide/ 
 
The LNG contracts tend to be of a long-term type, but ‘spot trade’ or ‘spot 
contracting’ is also widely used. The short time trading is common for the situation with 
interrupted supplies and unpredicted consumption growth. Since the world demand for the 
natural gas is growing, the expensive LNG is likely to expand its infrastructure and gain 
more popularity among importers. The regionalization of the natural gas market is explained 
below: 
 Russia/Eurasia/Europe. The importers of Europe and Central Asia represent 
about 45percent of the world's gas consumption. The European Union member states along 
with others use substantial amounts of natural gas; roughly a one fourth of the E.U.’s energy 
comes from natural gas, and Russia makes half of its energy with the natural gas. The 
supplies are made via numerous pipelines mostly going from East to West. Russia (more 
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than 25 percent of world exports and largest reserves), Norway, the Netherlands, and 
Uzbekistan are highest net exporters in Europe.  
In addition to its own exports, Russia also provides its pipelines for the transit of the 
Central Asian gas to Europe, which, again, rises concerns of the energy security in the region. 
In this regard several concurrent projects of alternative pipeline routes are underway as well 
as other activities aimed at minimizing the European dependence on Russian gas. 
North America. This region accounts for another quarter of the world’s import and 
has its own  extensive pipeline system. North America makes up to 25 percent of all energy 
consumed in from natural gas. The United States ranks first in the gas consumption (with 
about 20 percent imported) and second in the gas production. Neither Canada nor Mexico 
are major exporters outside the continent. The United States is a major player in the LNG 
market, its export reached 1,7 billion cbm in 2007 and almost all of those went to Japan; 
Asia/Oceania. The most populated region in the world accounts for only 15 percent of 
global consumption. In case of China the rate of gas usage in energy production is only 3 
percent, India makes as much as 8 percent and both states are importing very small amounts 
of LNG, producing the rest domestically. Gas is outbeat by coal in both regions due to its 
cheaper price and easier accessibility. 
In case of the Republic of Korea, the gas consumption is estimated to double in 
coming 20 years, which, in the view of near-zero domestic production, gives the country no 
other choice but securing the long-term supplies from the gas-rich neighbors. But for 
continental China the situation is not that straight: it is capable of producing certain 
percentage of domestic needs, but has to import gas for the regions far from its own supplies. 
At the same time China has to limit the imports not to let the imported gas outbid its own 
producers from the local market.  
Asian countries export and import LNG actively, leaded by Malaysia and Indonesia 
(both in the world’s top ten net exporters) and world’s biggest LNG importers – Japan and 
the Republic of Korea. 
Africa and Middle East. The consumption reaches less than 13 percent of the 
world's total, but many of the world's leading LNG exporters belong to the area- Algeria, 
Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Qatar, Egypt, and Libya. Almost half of the 
worlds LNG exports originates here – and the region is most likely to keep its dominance in 
the future. Noticeably, most of the gas produced goes abroad with extremely little part used 
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within the region. Iran has certain limitations implied to its technology advance and hence 
has to stick to the pipelines for its exports. Saudi Arabia does not export gas despite being 
the fourth-largest reserves holder. Nigeria is also in the top-ten list of reserves’ holders but 
so far have not found a way to utilize the gas coming with the oil and simply burns it.  
 Latin America. The smallest amounts of gas consumed annually, with only a small 
amount being exported. The misbalance of projected supply and actual demand has driven 
the LNG importation program to the active stages.  
(d) Russian players on the global market 
Among several key players of the Russian natural gas industry, Rosneft is active with 
the surveillance on Sakhalin and Kamchatka in order to prepare future grounds for the big 
projects. Rosneft was granted surveying rights to Veninski (Sakhalin-3), Western Schmidski 
(Sakhalin-4), Kaigansko-Vasyukanski and Western Schmid (Sakhalin-5) in 2003, with 
foreign businesses actively participating in the process of surveillance (Rosneft controls 
49.8%, 51%, and 51%, respectively of the S-3, S-4, and S-5 projects above)4. 
The Exxon-Mobil and Chevron have been in control of Western-Odoptinski, Aiyahskii, and 
Kirinski of Sakhalin-3 since 1993 until the licenses were revoked in 2004 therefore 
eliminating the future of the PSA project, which was able to outgrow the ambitious Sakhalin 
1 and 2. The foreign participation was limited to 50% or less after the revocation, and the 
remaining blocks of Sakhalin were contendered by Rosneft, Gazprom, Lukoil, Sinopec, 
ONGC, ExxonMobil and Chevron. Thus foreign participation in this project will represent 
the “government-business partnership” instead of PSA and will mean smaller scale. the costs 
for each project are estimated around $10-15 billion; exploration activities conducted in 
2006-2008 alone will cost $100 million5.  
 
A consortium was created between Gazprom, Rosneft, and Surgutneftegasin 2003 in 
order to coordinate the joint development of hydrocarbon resources in Eastern Russia, but the 
consortium did not make it way to successful operating due to numerous disputes of its 
members. Though, the idea may get revived for the purpose of further development of 
Russian Far East. The procedure finished in April, 2007, allowed Gazprom to join the other 
parties of the Sakhalin-2 project as the leader: while Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi are holding 
27.5 to 10 percent of shares each, Gazprom got 50 percent plus one share.  
                                                        
4 Rosneft website http://www.rosneft.ru/ (Accessed August 15, 2006.) 
5 Ibid 
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3. Gazprom – company overview 
 
(a) Company history profile 
Gazprom (Russian derivative from Gazovaya Promyshlennost – [Ministry of] Gas 
Industry) was established in 1965 after a series of successful researches led to exploration of 
massive deposits of natural gas in Siberia. The Ministry dealt with exploration, extraction, 
transportation and distribution of the natural gas. In 1989 it was reformed into RAO 
‘Gazprom’, later in 1990-es transformed into ‘Gazprom JSC”.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gazprom lost roughly one fourth of its 
infrastructure located in now ‘former Soviet Republics’, but continued its work on both 
domestic and foreign markets, remaining one of the few companies with stable income 
regardless of political and economic situation in Russia.  
Gazprom’s top management submitted a new corporate reform plan to its board of 
directors on March 29, 2006. This latest reform involves two key steps and should have 
taken about two years to complete. In the first step, the Gazprom subsidiaries, which own or 
lease about 80% of the company's property, separate out their non-core assets into special 
“buffer” companies. In the second step, the “buffer” companies are to merge according to 
business segment. One company will then be selected to be the principal company at the core 
of the segment, and the others will be linked to it. The buffer companies will be consolidated 
into six new entities managing different business segments: Gazprom-PKhG (underground 
storage), Gazprompererabotka (processing), Gazpromseverpodzemremont (northern 
underground maintenance), Gazpromyugpodzemremont (southern underground 
maintenance), Gazpromtrans, and Gazpromtrans-Kuban. Gazprom expects to increase its 
share in Gazpromtrans to 100%. 
The projected reforms were estimated to increase bureaucracy and expand annual 
corporate administrative spending by $100 million per year or more but also to reveal 
Gazprom's actual expenses, and with such new transparency, market capitalization was 
expected to increase by more than $30 billion. A successful reorganization should allow the 
Gazprom management to find out whether or not its businesses are profitable. (Table 5.) 
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Table 5. Gazprom Activities Structure 
The future of the company’s reforms is unclear, and will depend to a large extent on progress 
made within the larger economy. Specifically, the process of reforming the Gazprom 
monopoly should be linked with major reform in internal energy prices; otherwise, major 
economic distortions will ensue. 
 
Financial highlights 
The financial highlights of the Gazprom as per the fiscal year ended on December 31, 
2008, are given below: 
Earnings (net of VAT, excise and other taxes) RUB 2,507 bln 
Net profit RUB 173 bln 
Profit per share RUB 7.31 
Capital investments (net of VAT) RUB 264 bl 
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Table 6. Financial performance of Gazprom 
 Year ended 31 December
2008 
Year ended 31 December 
2007 
Sales (net of excise tax, 
VAT and customs duties) 
3,518,960 2,423,245 
Operating expenses (2,159,690) (1,713,759) 
Impairment and other 
provisions 
(98,964) (7,708) 
Operating profit 1,206,306 701,778 
Gain on disposal of a share 
on subsidiary 
- 50,853 
Profit (loss) from changes 
in fair value of call options 
(50,738) 50,738 
Revized Accounting 
treatment of NPF Gazfund 
- 44,692 
Finance income 165,603 159,380 
Finance expense (341,179) (132,573) 
Share of net income (loss) 
associated undertakings 
and jointly controlled 
companies 
(16,686) 24,234 
Gain on disposal available-
for-sale financial assets 
_14,326 _25,102 
Profit before taxation 1,031,632 924,204 
Current income tax 
expense 
(307,094) (218,266) 
Deffered profit tax 
expense 
46,846 10,953 
Income tax (260,252) (229,219) 
Profit for the year 771,380 694,985 
Profit for the period 
attributable to: Equity 
holders  of OAO 
GAzprom 
 
742,928 
 
658,038 
Minority interest 28,452 36,947 
 771,380 694,985 
 
Sales (net of excise, VAT and Customs duties) increase by RR 1, 095,715 million , or 45%, 
to RR 3, 518, 960 million in the year ended 31 December 2008 compared to the year ended 
31 December 2007. This increase was primarily due to the increase of the volume of gas sold 
to Europe and Asia and as well higher gas prices in all geographical segments. 
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Transportation system and storage review 
 
It was in 1930s when the first pipeline linked Moscow and Saratov establishing the 
future gas transportation network. Today’s Unified Gas Supply System of Russia, solely 
owned and operated by Gazprom, was mostly completed in 1970-1990, covering the tasks of 
collecting, processing, storing and transferring the vast amounts of gas both internally and on 
the export routes. The scale and complexity of the system are unpreceeded.  
Within the framework of bilateral agreements Gazprom secured its presence in the 
strategic countries by either acquiring or setting up it’s own warehouses and storage facilities 
in Austria, Belgium, Rumania, Turkey and UK, aiming at the future establishment of a 
separate “Podzemgaz” storage operating subsidiary. But here comes another problem that 
Gazprom could not avoid – the aging of its infrastructure and facilities.  
Gazprom owns the entire 150,000-kilometer gas-pipeline infrastructure in Russia, 
including the compressing stations, to control the delivery of gas to domestic and export 
markets6. 
 More than 70% of the large diameter transmission lines were commissioned before 
1985, and more than 19,000 km of pipeline are beyond their designed life span and will need 
replacement soon. The investment required for the renewal and repairs of the transmission 
system will increase sharply over the next two decades, including the investments needed to 
connect new fields to the existing pipelines.  
The project of separating the transportation and Gazprom's production arm, has been 
abandoned. It is frequently stated by Gazprom that it has no intention to limit the 
independent producers’ access to the pipelines’ network. It is clear the Gazprom will only 
benefit if its gas on domestic market will be replaced by the other suppliers’ therefore 
leaving more for Gazprom to export. However, lack of transmission capacity has precluded 
independent producers from gaining access.(see Appendix) 
As part of a larger strategy of international expansion, Gazprom has a stake in a 
number of transport companies outside Russia, such as SPP in Slovakia, and has also formed 
alliances and partnerships in key transit nations to secure deliveries. In 2006, Gazprom 
                                                        
6 Under the current law, Gazprom is the only company in Russia authorized to export gas outside the CIS. It is also 
obligated to provide its’ domestic pipelines’ capacity to the independent producers, but Gazprom usually refuses to do so 
referring to the ‘overloaded capacity’. 
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negotiated the purchase of Armrosgazprom and a 40-km section of the Iran-Armenia gas 
pipeline with the Armenian government.  
Historically, most of Russia’s natural gas exports went to Eastern Europe and to 
customers of the Soviet Union (now independent CIS states). The turning point appeared in 
the mid-80s, when export shifted towards major consumers – Europe, Japan, Turkey, and 
other Asian countries. The goal of Gazprom is clear – in order to maintain European export 
growth it has to both increase the output and secure alternate transportation routes. Another 
issue is related to the pricing policy of Gazprom, namely the difference between the 
domestic price and the export one. EU economists accused Gazprom of its dominant market 
position and double-tiered pricing, The result was not surprising: the domestic independent 
producers were granted access to the pipelines network, and the domestic prices for 
industrial consumers were doubled (although still remaining twice as low as the European 
ones), showing signs of fair trading..  
As with oil, Russia encounters with Kazakhstan as a competing gas provider to the 
Asian Gas markets. In case the projected pipeline is built from Kazakhstan to China, it may 
become an alternate route for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan exports to China as well. 
Exploration and Production 
Among the world’s top 24 oil and gas companies, Gazprom holds third place in 
combined hydrocarbon reserves with roughly 200 billion barrels of oil equivalent. Natural 
gas constitutes the vast majority of the reserves.  
 
Table 7. Russian Natural Gas Production and Export 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total 
production 
590.1 584.1 581 596.6 617.6 634 641.9 656.2 
Gazprom 545.5 523.1 512 523.8 540.2 545.1 547.9 550.5 
independents 6 18 n.a 29.9 33.5 n.a 36 47.3 
Oil 
Companies 
38.6 43 n.a 42.9 43.9 44.9 58 58.4 
Gas Export 126.8 129 126.7 129.4 138.9 149.1 151.3 151.5 
Source: Gazprom: “Gas Matters” (August 2006); Interfax, January 9, 2007 BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy (2007); Jonathan Stern, “The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom” (Oxford University Press, 2005)   
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The most promising are the Yamal, Shtokmanovskoye and Kovyktinskoye fields. 
The Shtokmanovskoye field has development priority over the Yamal because the estimated 
cost for development is about one-half that of Yamal. Moreover, there are unresolved 
ecological issues associated with the development of Yamal. 
The growth of gas production in Eastern Siberia and the Far East will depend 
primarily on the profitability of gas exports to Asia-Pacific regions.  The second potentially 
large-scale development will be the Kovyktinskoye field in the Irkutsk area. It is very likely 
that Gazprom will take control of the Kovyktinskoye field in the near future.  
 
(b) Deposits and Reserves analysis in Russian Far East 
Russia is sometimes adjected as the world’s gas-holder, with up to twenty new giant 
gas fields containing over 500bcm of gas discovered thus comprising close to three-quarters 
of Russia’s total gas reserves. The Russian Far East alone can produce up to 130 bcm of 
natural gas by 2020 – the scale of today’s export to Europe – and is surely to play important 
role in the East Asian energy system.  
Kovykta gas field 
Discovered in 1987, this Russia’s largest gas field contains an estimated two trillion 
cubic meters of natural gas and condensate7, which is more than Canada has in all of its 
deposits. Kovykta’s location provides great opportunities for China and South Korea, as well 
as benefits for Russia. The development of the field would mean a major shift in the export 
routes balance, resulting in diversification of Russia’s gas export market. A carefully planned 
pipeline extension to the North East Asia would present significant opportunities for Russia 
in the increased tax revenues, boosted regional development and energy security. Gazprom 
produced 570bcm of gas in 2008 and exported around 300bcm — approximately half the 
total—to Europe, the Baltic States, and Central Asia8. Thus, potential Kovykta gas exports of 
30 bcm per year yields 10% of Gazprom’s present export volume.  
However, domestic consumption of gas supplied from the Kovykta field is relatively 
small, it amounts to only 2 bcm used by small cities of Angarsk, Sayansk, Irkutsk, and 
                                                        
7 “Kovykta Project,” TNK-BP u http://www.tnk-bp.com/operations/exploration-production/projects/kovykta/ 
8 “Gazprom Annual Report 2006,” OAO Gazprom, 2006 u http://www.gazprom.com/documents/Report_Eng.pdf 
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Usolye-Sibirsk9. These populations are unlikely to use as much gas as this field could 
produce, which again underlines the necessity of pulling the Kovykta gas to the Asian 
markets. 
Yakutia gas and oil field 
Yakutia is another huge reserve of gas available for Asian delivery. Talakan and 
Chayandinsk gas deposits, located close to the well-known Koviktinsk gas field combined 
with other smaller ones are estimated up to 9.4 trillion cubic meterswith2.3 billion cubic 
meters explored reserves. Most resources are concentrated in region bordering Irkutsk, in 
Southwest Yakutia with Chayandinsk leading 1.24 trillion cubic meters reserves managed by 
Gazprom and Sakhaneftegaz with projected yearly output of up to 23-27 billion cubic meters, 
and $3.5 billion dollars of investment required to develop. There is six times as much gas as 
oil in Yakutia, but the development is still at the very basic stage if non-yet started. The 
reason is not obvious – since Yakutia gas is rich with helium (roughly 70 percent of Russia’s 
deposits), it is more profitable to develop the chemical processing infrastructure first to use 
full advantages of the deposit later. The political reasons are less obvious but are still 
influential: a kind of counteraction is seen in the management of the region since the federal 
government has increased its control over regions. It is clear that regional leaders are 
promoting the earlier development of these deposits, counteracting with the federal 
authorities who call for conservation.  
 
Sakhalin Island’s projects 
At present, 5 projects are being carried out on Sakhalin based on licenses granted in 
the 1990s: 
(1).Sakhalin 1 (deposits: oil - 307 Mt., gas - 485 Bcm), carried out by a consortium 
directed by the American company Exxon Mobil (30%) with the participation of the 
following companies: the Japanese SODECO (30%), the Indian ONGC (20%), and the 
Russian Rosneft (20%). Until now, the invested funds have amounted to over 4.5 billion 
USD (for a planned total of 12 billion USD). In October 2005, oil production began, which 
from the end of 2006 is to be sold on the world market.  
                                                        
9 Ibid 
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The three fields - Chayvo, Odoptu and Arkutun-Dagi - potential recoverable resources are 
projected to yield 2.3 billion barrels (366 million m.) of oil and 17.1 trillion ft. (485 billion 
cubic meters of gas) of gas10. 
The consortium completed a Production-Sharing Agreement (“PSA”) between the Sakhalin-1 
consortium, the Russian Federation (“RF”), and the Sakhalin Government in 199611. 
 
(2).Sakhalin 2 (deposits: oil - 185 Mt., gas - 800 bcm. A consortium was formed to 
recon and process the gas offshore and in-land, with two main fields of Piltun-Astokhskoye 
and Lunskoye12. 
The consortium was originally formed by Marathon, McDermott and Mitsuiin 1991, joined 
by Shell and Mitsubishi in 1992. The first PSA was completed in 1994 after establishing the 
consortium, the production started in 1999. One year later only Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Shell 
remained in the list of participants. 
Before shares in the Consortium consisted by:  
55% - Shell Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (Shell - UK/Netherlands), 25% - Mitsui Sakhalin 
Holdings B.V. (Mitsui - Japan), 20% - Diamond Gas Sakhalin (Division of Mitsubishi - 
Japan).  
 
New agreed distribution of shares after nationalization are:  
50% - Gazprom, 27.5% - Shell, 12.5% - Mitsui, 10% - Mitsubishi13. 
 
In 2005, Shell signed the document where by agreement swap 25% of Sakhalin-II to 
Gazprom, in exchange for 50% of a natural gas field in the Russian Arctic, plus cash. Shell 
doubled its cost estimates for Sakhalin-II to $20 billion. On December 21, 2006, Gazprom 
took control over a 50%-plus-one-share stake in the project by signing an agreement with 
Royal Dutch Shell14. 
In 2005 Sakhalin Energy signed a deal with Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS). Under the 
agreement, Sakhalin Energy will ship 1.5 million tons of LNG annually to KOGAS for 20 
years from a LNG plant south of the Sakhalin Island, starting 2009.  
 
                                                        
10 Sakhalin 1 project  www.sakhalin1.com/index.asp 
11 Tatiana Pashchenko, Geoffrey Picton-Turbervill, «Gas Regulation 2007» 
12 Sakhalin 1 project  www.sakhalin1.com/index.asp 
13 Sakhalin 2 project  www.sakhalinenergy.com/project/prj_overview.asp 
14 Ibid 
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 (3). Sakhalin 3 (deposits: oil - 800 Mt., gas - 1,4 Bcm) is in the preliminary stages 
of realization, although the consortium under the direction of ExxonMobil (33,3%), with the 
participation of Texaco (33,3%) and Rosneft (33,3%) has won the relevant call for tenders in 
1993. For the time being, only several dozen million dollars have been invested, which led to 
the Russian government cancelling the results of the call for tender in February 2004, and 
announced the organization of a new one. In October 2005, the company Rosneft announced 
the granting of a 25% stake in the project to the Chinese Sinopec. 
 
(4). Sakhalin 4 and 5 - both are under the control of the consortium of BP (49%) and 
Rosneft (51%) and, for the time being, are in the very early stages of either realisation, 
geological studies, or the first drillings15. 
 
(c) Interaction of Gazprom and independent producer Rosneft 
Gazprom is facing a tough competition with Rosneft, which in contrast with 
Gazprom, has the actual ownership rights to develop Far East gas fields. 
Rosneft is the second largest oil company in the world in terms of recoverable 
reserves (3.4 billion tons)16. At its IPO in summer of 2006, 49% of shares were sold for 
$10.4 billion, therefore giving Rosneft a market value of $80 billion with shares acquired by 
BP, China National Petroleum, and Petronas of Malasia. The largest stake of $2.6 billion 
went to a single unidentified buyer (possibly Gazprom).  
Rosneft’s Far Eastern gas proven reserves total 63.3 billion cubic meters, with 
unexplored probable reserves of 402 billion cubic meters. When possible reserves are 
included, Rosneft’s resources in the RFE total up to 1,630 billion cubic meters of gas. 
Rosneft has been involved with the Sakhalin-1 project since its inception. It owns 20% of the 
operating company Sakhalin Energy, established by Product Sharing Agreement. The gas 
portion of this project is currently exported to Russia for domestic use, and is slated to 
provide gas to Japan, China, and/or South Korea. In an important agreement of June 2006, 
Rosneft and Gazprom signed a contract that will give Gazprom control of Rosneft’s share of 
                                                        
15 Energy Information Administration  ww.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sakhalin/Background.html 
16 Nina Poussenkova, “Rosneft as a Mirror of Russia's Evolution,” originally published in Pro et Contra Journal 10, no 2 
(June 2006), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Rosneft.pdf (accessed July 15, 2006). 
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gas from Sakhalin projects for export17. This agreement suggests that Gazprom’s relationship 
with Rosneft may prove to be more cooperative than competitive. 
(d) Value Chain of Gazprom Company 
Gazprom is vertically integrated so fully diversified energy company managing the 
exploration, production, sale, and distribution of gas for both domestic and foreign markets; 
the production and sale of crude oil and gas condensate; hydrocarbon refining operations. 
Gazprom has a heavy presence in the petrochemical industry, in machine tools and 
metallurgy, and has also branched much further a field in recent years by moving into the 
media and banking sectors.  
Gazprom’s “networks” are organized around its subsidiaries. It has more than 60 branches. 
(see in Appendix) 
 
 
Table 8.Value Chain of Gazprom Company 
 
                                                        
17 Doklad «Ekonomicheskoe Razvitie Vostoka» 
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Since 2001, the company has been in the process of intracorporate reforms aimed at 
enhancing business efficiency. A successful reorganization should allow the Gazprom 
management to find out whether or not its businesses are profitable. 
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4. Gazprom growth strategy in North East Asia 
 
(a) Current situation and prospects of NEA Gas Markets 
The natural gas market of North East Asia is one of the youngest yet fastest-growing 
markets. As it was mentioned before, there are no significant gas deposits aside from the 
ones hidden in the vast territory of China. Japan and South Korea are leading the list of the 
gas importers worldwide with growing demand for efficient and clean fuel. The three Asian 
giants are in continuous quest for minimized costs and maximized efficiency of fuel supplies, 
and the trend of surging LNG consumption is not likely to be affected by the 2008-2009 
economic downturn. Compared to the pre-crisis forecast of 80-100 percent growth of natural 
gas consumption in the region within coming decade, today’s outlook is less determined but 
yet better for NG producers. The crisis has set the new standards for cost-efficiency and 
energy-saving, and these trends are likely to stay mainstream in coming years. Thus, natural 
gas fits most of the requirements of the post-crisis energy source demand: it is efficient, 
relatively cheap and ecologically friendly.  
In terms of the pre-crisis development terms the consumption of the natural gas in the 
region was supposed to almost double within coming decade. The economic downturn of 
2008-2009 resulted in numerous issues for both exporters and importers of the natural gas, 
although the original concerns of the energy security in the region are still topping the list: 
the traditional way for importing gas is the sea freight (except for China) which is very 
vulnerable and is subject to numerous obstacles of climatic and political nature. The 
analytics of energy industry are far from being unanimous in their forecasts: Thus, the 
supply of LNG by sea from Middle East is neither stable nor reliable, and the pipeline feed 
with a long-term contract would be a much more preferable in terms of national energy 
security of Korea and Japan.  
Countries like Korea and Japan have long been known for their hi-tech industry that 
is based mostly on the imported resources. The economical success roots in their ability to 
manage profitability of the industry by minimizing the costs of imported resources and raw 
materials while using the most out of the imported ones, improving the recycling and energy 
saving technologies as it directly reflects on the national economy.  
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Hence the prospects for the natural gas in Asia look brighter now and the predicted 
consumption growth rate is not to be noticeably affected by the recession, but the situation 
differs for each country of the region.  
Statistics show that Asia consumed 459 bcm of natural gas in 2008 and regional 
demand is supposed to exceed 560 bcm in the next 5 years, with local production of 356 bcm 
of 2008 expected to grow up to 490 bcm by 2013. The figures above include both huge 
importers like Korea and Japan together with the major exporters like Malaysia and 
Indonesia. The gap is to be filled with the imported gas, though the need for the import 
differs from country to country as the locally produced gas goes other parts of the globe as 
well. Three biggest economies of the North East Asia – China, Japan and Korea – need to be 
examined one by one to understand the regional future of the natural gas. Although China 
puzzles its partners with delays of the agreed deliveries, and Japan claims that LNG import is 
likely to decrease due to large stock accumulated during the recession period, most analysts 
agree that Asia-Pacific consumers will follow the European scenario in the gas consumption.  
 
a) People’s Republic of China 
According to BMI report China consumed 17.60 per cent of gross Asian gas in 2008, 
while producing 21.36 per cent of the regional gas. Despite the downturn of the world 
economy, China is expanding its gas consumption steadily, with estimated regional gas 
consumption share forecast to reach 20.70 per cent with production of roughly 20 per cent. 
Chinese domestic gas production scaled 76 bcm in 2008 but the government reports 
confirm that the national production should reach 120 bcm by 2018. Still, growing domestic 
production will not be able to feed the surging domestic demand which is estimated to 
almost double in the coming decade. The gap is intended to be filled with the imported gas, 
partially with the Russian supplies over two projected pipelines to be built, partially by LNG 
imports from the regional producers. 
During the latest economic downturn China maintained stable demand for the natural 
gas, having no spot contracts in the late 2008 but following the long-term contracts with 
Australia and accepting single cargoes of LNG reverted by Japan and Korea due to their 
internal situations.  
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b) Japan 
Japan’s share of Asian gas intake reached 20.43% in 2008 but, unlike China, it has an 
extremely small volume of production. The consumption of Japan is expected to be around 
17.73% within coming 5 years. 
Japanese real GDP is expected to decline by 6.1% in 2009, compared to 0.7% fall of 2008, 
and the gas consumption in 2009 is forecasted to fall by 10 percent. This tendency has 
already caused Japan cancel several LNG cargoes (all of which has been resold to China or 
Europe). Starting from 2010 the GDP is expected to begin slow growth, bringing the 
country’s annual natural gas consumption to an approximate 100bcm of gas by 2013, 100 
per cent of which brought via LNG supplies, and possibly up to 105bcm by 2018. The 
freshly built Sakhalin Prigorodnoye LNG terminal is to become the main source for supplies, 
while expensive LNG from Middle East is unlikely to be contracted massively anymore. 
 
с) Republic of Korea  
Among Asian consumers South Korea took 8.66% share in 2008 while domestic production 
being minimal. The need for gas is forecast to be 7.44% of Asian gross by 2013. 
At the present economical state Korean demand is falling, but the future prospects are 
similar to those of Japan: spot trading of LNG cargoes may be given up in favor of long-term 
contracts for easily and quickly accessible Sakhalin LNG supplies. The natural gas is more 
favorable for the commodity usage in the quasi-island isolated South Korea, and a favorable 
choice for environment-concerned highly populated country.  
Commonly referred to as a market with moderate possibilities, Korea may expand its gas 
consumption once the LNG supplies become as stable as pipelines, and thus the original 
forecast of 41.8 bcm demand for 2013 may get revised. In terms of regional proportions, 
South Korea will still be a middle range importer, and, unless a major political shift in the 
North Korean communist state occurs, incapable of using any other but LNG source of gas. 
In case the pipeline via North Korean territory becomes a reality, South Korea may become a 
regional hub for the Russian gas transit.  
The unified development plan is surely to face certain problems in implementation 
since development of the Russian Far East is connected to the issues of producing capacity, 
markets and political situation.  
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Table 9. Five Porter’s Forces     
  Threats of Substitutes 
(very low) 
• new ‘clean’ technology 
• coal, in some sectors 
 
    
Bargaining Power of  
Suppliers 
(very High) 
•Controls more than 70% in 
Russia and 17% reserves 
globally 
•diversified energy company 
managing the exploration, 
production, sale, and 
distribution 
•sole owner and operator of 
the Unified Gas Supply 
System of Russia 
•cost effective type of gas 
transportation (LNG) 
•creation  gas national unified 
system 
•proximity to the market 
•strong Government support 
 Intencity of Rivalry 
(Medium) 
• more deposits of gas  
• cost effective  projects 
offer by independent 
producers 
 
 
Bargaining Power of 
Buyers (Medium) 
•End-users face  minimal cost
•eco-friendly fuel 
•domestic gas price relatively 
low 
 
     
  Threat of new entry 
(Medium) 
•Reserves declining and no 
rights on unexplored and 
potential resources of Sakhalin
•Intention of independent gas 
producers to enter the  market 
•lack of infrastructure (use 
expensive technology) 
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The domestic consumption is too weak to justify the investment needed for the RFE 
projects development, therefore the  international coordination and investment will be 
necessary Gazprom’s focus on the Asia Pacific region may be limited by the market 
characteristics of the countries of this region. Since China, Korea and Japan use mostly LNG 
(75% of total world production of LNG), and have only just begun considering pipelines, 
Gazprom may find its possible market in the North East Asia highly limited. 
Transporting via LNG (liquefied natural gas) tanker becomes more cost effective 
than pipeline at distances greater than ~1,200 miles. The first shipment of LNG by Gazprom 
to Japan and Korea was completed on 11 September 2006.(Table 10) 
Table 10. Demand For Natural Gas Import In the NEA Countries, Billion Cubic Meters {1,2} 
Indices 2005 2010 2020 
Total demand 
China 
Repulic of Korea 
Japan 
144,3 
24,3 
40 
80 
229-316 
100-140 
41-72 
88-104 
269-386 
130-180 
46-82 
93-124 
Domestic Production 
China 
Repulic of Korea 
Japan 
55,8 
52,8 
- 
3 
54-86 
50-80 
1-2 
3-4 
74-106 
70-100 
1-2 
3-4 
Import Demand 
China 
Repulic of Korea 
Japan 
117 
- 
40 
77 
175-230 
50-60 
40-70 
85-100 
195-280 
60-80 
45-80 
90-120 
 
The Gazprom Development program is now working in the framework of the 
agreement regarding building gas pipeline to China. Initial ‘counter-pipeline’ decision was 
cancelled by the new agreement signed in March 2006, which committed Russia to deliver 
80 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually via two projected pipelines. (Table 11.) 
 
Table 11. Chinese demand for Russian gas (Forecast, in bcm per annum) 
 2005 2010 2020 
Eastern Siberia 0.0 12.0 30.0 
Western Siberia 0.0 0.0 30.0 
Total 0.0 12.0 60.0 
Source: China OGP 2003, in:Keun-Wook Paik,op.cit. 
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Gazprom  is  now  to  control  the  gas  supplies  to China, expected to begin in 2011 
through the western, or “Altai,” pipeline. (The “Eastern” pipeline will transport gas from 
Eastern Siberia and the RFE to China, with the mainframe infrastructure to be completed 
between 2011 and 2020. The supplies, which will feed the Eastern pipeline, will originate 
from the Koviktinsk field and Sakhalin shelf deposits. The annual flow will reach 30-40 
billion cubic meters supplied by Eastern Siberia and Sakhalin in rough 5:3 proportion. 
The Koviktinsk field alone is capable of covering the Eastern pipeline quota, while 
Sakhalin is likely to be used for Asian exports. Sakhalin’s location, quantity and accessibility 
of its resources of 1,118.8 billion cubic meters of gas and 88.5 million tons of gas 
condensate make the perfect match for the Asian consumers, with the total possible 
resources of 5 trillion cbm. Should the plans be implied in a proper way, the output of 
Sakhalin may exceed 125 billion cbm of gas per year. Another advantage of Sakhalin 
projects is absence of helium in the gas, which makes it easier and cheaper to process.  
 A boom in Asian demand may open export opportunities as Gazprom taps new 
Siberian fields. The Moscow-based company, which in 2008 sent all its exports west, entered 
the Asian market this year by shipping liquefied gas from its Sakhalin Island development. 
It’s seeking to add customers in the region after pricing disputes with Ukraine disrupted 
shipments to Europe twice since 2006. 
 
(b) Gazprom Challenges and Future Scenarios 
Gazprom, the world’s biggest natural gas producer, is planning to start piping East 
Siberian gas to Asia, where an increase in demand over the next 20 years may outpace 
growth in its traditional European markets. Gazprom will send surplus gas east from the 
Yakutia fields, Deputy Chief Executive Officer Alexander Ananenkov said at a ceremony in 
the eastern town of Khabarovsk, as work began on a new pipeline to the Pacific Ocean. 
While Gazprom may benefit from increased demand in Asia, the company will need 
to contend with lower prices in the region. European gas supply contracts are linked to oil 
with a time lag of six to nine months, meaning the 2010 price will reflect crude’s 60 percent 
jump this year. By contrast, Asian prices probably won’t be pegged to oil cost. 
China, Asia Pacific’s fastest-growing gas market, caps prices for the fuel. The 
country has kept tariffs lower than international market rates to promote the use of gas over 
coal, according to IEA. 
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Europe will continue to pay the highest prices, making it “the most attractive gas 
market in the long run. Gazprom may also face competition from other exporters to Asia. 
Asian nations already purchase gas from Atlantic, Pacific and Middle Eastern suppliers, 
mostly in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG), a business that Gazprom only entered. 
The Russian government has instructed Gazprom to coordinate its Eastern gas 
development plan, prioritizing supply to local residents isolated from the grid. Most gas from 
Sakhalin Island, which is only 100 miles from the northern tip of Japan, will be used 
domestically, meaning Gazprom will need to tap new Siberian fields for export. 
Gas demand in Russia’s Far East may reach 25 billion cubic meters in 2020, 
outstripping forecast production of 24 billion cubic meters from Gazprom’s Sakhalin-3 
offshore project, according to company estimates. Yakutia may pump more than double that 
amount. The area, which holds about 2 trillion cubic meters of gas, may produce as much as 
53 billion cubic meters a year by 2030, Deputy Chief Executive Officer Alexander 
Ananenkov said. That gas will feed a planned 2,700-kilometer (1,680-mile) pipe to 
Khabarovsk, which will be extended to the Pacific port of Vladivostok. 
Gazprom is studying fuel exports from Vladivostok in the form of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG), which is gas that’s chilled to a liquid for transportation by tanker, or as 
compressed gas18.  The company aims to send a third of its exports to new markets in the US 
and Asia by 2030 after opening up fields in eastern Russia. 
Russia has enough gas to supply Asian customers as well as European markets, 
“without diversifying the development of the country eastward, our economy has no future.” 
President Dmitry Medvedev said. Gazprom accounted for 10% of Russian GDP last year. 
The company entered the market for liquefied natural gas in March when it started 
shipments to Asia from Russia’s first LNG plant on Sakhalin Island. Sakhalin Energy, led by 
Gazprom, has so far sent 27 tankers loaded with LNG. It plans to ship about 55 tankers this 
year. An annual 7 billion cubic meters of Sakhalin gas will feed the first phase of Gazprom’s 
pipeline to the Pacific coast. Transit capacity will later be expanded to 47.2 billion cubic 
meters to include a proposed link from the Yakutia fields, allowing exports to Asia-Pacific 
markets. 
                                                        
18 Alexandr Ananenkov’s, Report Theses delivered at 4th “ALL-RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS WEEK”  
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2004/october/article62914/) 
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Natural gas is the cleanest fuel for toxic air pollutants greenhouse gases. The 
environmental concerns, oil prices unstability and the world economic crisis may result in 
the major shift towards gas usage. But, as any other source of energy, gas sets its own 
challenges: limitations of the pipeline building, transiting states’ political issues, 
infrastructure requirements for LNG infrastructure are somewhat deterring the possible 
buyers. In the middle of the 2009 spring the first supply of LNG was made from the 
ambituous and long-anticipated Sakhalin-2 project, starting a new era of the Russian gas 
presence in the North East Asian market. The ceremony of launch was attended by the 
Russian president and Japanese Prime Minister, underlining the importance and political 
significance of the event. Of course, Japan is not the only recipient of the Sakhalin gas, it 
will also get its users in US, Korea and other Asia-Pacific countries, since its projected 
capacity exceeds 9,5 million ton a year.  
 The launch of this project means first serious step towards diversifying the 
Gazprom’s export directions. The major part of 100 percent pre-contracted output of the 
Sakhalin gas will be consumed by Japan, and the rest will go to the LNG-hungry South 
Korea and US.  
The closely neighboring Prigorodnoye LNG Plant is the closest source of high-
quality LNG for Korea and Japan, and it is likely to replace the Middle East suppliers for its 
reliability and vast reserves. Another party to benefit from the launch of Sakhalin projects is 
the South Korea’s KOGAS corporation, which estimates the Russian pipelines to drive up to 
20 percent of the Korean gas needs. But, unless political problems solved, South Korea will 
have to rely solely on the sea LNG imports, which are to be improved with the now available 
Sakhalin LNG as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
(с)  SWOT Analysis 
Table 12. SWOT Analysis 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Gazprom is the legal successor of the • Gazprom depends on unexplored future 
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proprietary rights and obligations of 
Ministry of the Oil and Gas Industry, 
including the rights to use land, 
subsurface reserves, natural resources 
• Engaged in production, transportation, 
distribution, sales, research, and even 
regulation 
• Gazprom controls more than 70 % of the 
natural gas reserves in Russia and about 
17 % of natural gas reserves globally 
• Gazprom owns the gas trunklines 
integrated in the Unified Gas Supply 
System (UGSS) of Russia.  
• Strong Government support: 
• (The Government’s stake in Gazprom is 
over 50% and has a majority on the 
company’s board of directors) 
• Gazprom is the sole founder of about 60 
subsidiaries  
• Gazprom provides 25% of all Russian tax 
revenues and accounts for 9% of the 
nation’s gross domestic product 
LNG and CNG production 
projects of Sakhalin 
• Available reserves are declining 
• Some sources (rich fields) are 
geographically distant from the possible 
markets  
• Long-distance pipeline building questions 
the profitability of the new fields 
• Absence of sources in Russia for 
investment financing 
• The lack of sufficient international 
authority and image in Russian 
companies, Gazprom as well, for 
successful competition in international 
markets;  
• The absence of effective and ecologically 
safe technologies, facilities and services 
for the extraction of hydrocarbons in 
complex natural conditions and ice 
conditions from the sea shelf in Russia 
• Domestic and partially exporting pipeline 
network needs to be dismantled and 
repaired. 
• Not quite transparent structure is due to 
complicated system of internal 
transactions and unregulated system of 
internal pricing on the items. 
• Tax burden do not create a favorable 
investment climate. 
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Opportunities  Threats 
• New sectors where natural gas widely 
used are emerging  
• Gazprom obtain huge amount 
reserves of undiscovered fields of natural 
gas, Yamal and Shtokman fields 
• Due to its geographical position and 
energy resources, Russia has all the 
prerequisites to become an energy bridge 
between Europe and Asia 
• Natural Gas Demand is raising fast 
• The decline in the output of three oldest 
fields of Western Siberia- Urengoy, 
Yamburg, and Medvezh'ye - producing  
more than 70 percent of Gazprom's total. 
• Rise of the independent gas producers 
which make the main growth volume of 
gas trade.  
• An opposition to a projected 
Transcaspian pipeline which would 
enhance Europe's energy security but will 
definitely threat the Russian (literally: 
Gazprom’s) positions. 
• Independent producers are obtaining 
stronger position 
 
Gazprom is most likely to succeed in the attempt to become the leading regional supplier 
since it has all geographic, political, material advantages necessary. If considered the vast 
unexplored deposits of natural gas in the Russian Far East, the enormous demand for the fuel 
in China and overall growth rate of Asian economy, the strategy has to meet numerous 
criteria to become the successful one.  
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5. Recommendations 
 
The hydrocarbon resources of East Siberia and the Far East are of vital importance for the 
social and economic development of Russia's eastern regions, and are crucial for ensuring 
energy security of the North East Asia region. Once implemented, the main gas projects of 
Sakha, Irkutsk (Kovykta) and Sakhalin will form the basis for arranging the supplies of gas 
and deeper-conversion products to the Asia-Pacific countries via various routes. The major 
challenge should be to choose the best option to ensure comprehensive field development and 
use it as a basis to set up the production of polymer materials and a helium production center. 
This far only one noteworthy project was started with sole purpose for the regional supplies – 
the 'Sakhalin-2' system is clearly set to fill the need of two main importers, isolated from the 
continent – Korea and Japan. But still, both would prefer a sustainable supply via the 
traditional pipelines. In this regard, a careful feasibility study is suggested for Gazprom, 
Korea and Japan, since the construction of a underwater pipeline is just about as sophisticated 
as constructing the pipeline through the troubled North Korea.  
As per the Chinese demand, the Gazprom made its intentions clear, but it remains to be seen 
what Chinese side will do next: the energy policy of China is not working like it did 5 years 
back, so it is likely that Beijing lifts the limits for the foreign fuel quota and therefore will let 
the cheaper foreign gas substitute the Chinese coal.  
Each of the deposits set for development should be assigned a specific target for exportation, 
ensuring the most effective approach to the differentiated importers. Therefore, it appears 
feasible to develop Sakhalin gas exports only in the form of LNG, while supplying network 
gas and secondary products of hydrocarbon processing to China and Korea from East Siberia. 
This will promote the development of high-tech industries in the region, create opportunities 
for a concurrent development of deeper conversion facilities and hydrocarbon chemistry, 
encourage exports of LNG and high value-added products, and satisfy domestic and 
international demand for network gas. Basing on the result of the above analysis, it is obvious 
that Gazprom will not turn into a significant and massive regional supplier in the North East 
Asia unless a serious reform made in its infrastructure and investment strategy. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1.  Gazprom Group's Natural Gas Sales in 2008  
 2007 2008  Changes, % 
Sales (net of VAT, excise tax, and customs duties), billion RR 
Russia  399.5 474.3 18.7 
 Far Abroad 873.4 1,430.5 63.8 
 CIS and Baltic 
states 
269.6 356.5 32.2 
Total 1,542.5 2,261.3 46.6 
Sales volume, bcm   
Russia  307.0 287.0 -6.5 
Far Abroad  168.5 184.4  9.4 
 CIS and Baltic 
states 
100.9 96.5 -4.4 
Total  576.4 567.9 -1.5 
Average price for natural gas (net of VAT, excise tax, and customs duties), RR per 
mcm 
Russia  1,301.1 1,652.8 27.0 
Far Abroad 5,181.9 7,757.0 49.7 
CIS and Baltic 
states   
2,672.9 3,693.9 38.2 
  Source: Gazprom   
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Table 2. Gas Received Into And Distributed From Gazprom’s Gas Transportation System In 
The Russian Federation, Bcm 
 
 2007 2008 
Total amount received into the gas transportation system 706.7
  
714.3 
Amount received into the system  654.8
  
669.2
  
 including Central Asian gas    59.9 61.4 
Gas withdrawn from UGSF in Russia   41.7 36.1 
 Decrease in the amount of gas within the gas transportation system
   
10.2 9.0 
Total distribution from the gas transportation system  
  
706.7 714.3 
Supply to Russian consumers  356.4 352.8
  
 including Central Asian gas  0.1 0.1
  
Supply outside Russia  247.3 251.1 
including Central Asian gas  59.7 61.3
  
Gas pumped into UGSF in Russia 43.0 51.6 
Technical needs of the gas transportation system and UGSF 49.5 49.6
  
Increase in the amount of gas within the gas transportation system  10.5 9.2 
Source: Gazprom 
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Table 3. Gazprom Group’s Hydrocarbon Reserves In Accordance With The International 
Prms Standards  
 Natural gas, 
bcm  
  
Condensate, 
million tons 
Oil, million 
tons 
Total, million 
tce 
Proved reserves
  
18,175.56 587.90 713.13 22,863.2 
including Gazprom 
Neft   
60.99*  - 615.56  
Probable reserves 3,066.26 141.86 565.04 4,473.0 
Including Gazprom 
Neft  
  
147.15* - 379.35   
Proved and 
probable reserves 
21,241.82 729.76 1,278.17 27,336.2 
 including Gazprom 
Neft  
208.14* - 994.91   
Source: Gazprom  
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Table 4. Japan's Natural Gas Production and Consumption 1987-2007 
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Table 5. List of major companies with full or partial Gazprom ownership (as of early 2009)  
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Table 6. Gazprom’s Major Joint Ventures and Overseas Subsidiaries (incomplete)  
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Graph-1 Diversification of Gazprom’s export activity 
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Map 1. Natural Gas Pipelines 
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